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Abstract 
 
Prior research suggests that those who rely on intuition rather than effortful reasoning when 
making decisions are less averse to risk and ambiguity. The evidence is largely correlational, 
however, leaving open the question of the direction of causality. In this paper, we present 
experimental evidence of causation running from reliance on intuition to risk and ambiguity 
preferences. We directly manipulate participants’ predilection to rely on intuition and find that 
enhancing reliance on intuition lowers the probability of being ambiguity averse by 30 
percentage points and increases risk tolerance by about 30 percent in the experimental sub-
population where we would a priori expect the manipulation to be successful (males).   
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: D81; D83. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Understanding what shapes individuals’ attitudes toward risk and uncertainty is of 
fundamental importance to economists. Building on research in psychology arguing that 
intuition may provide better decisions in a variety of situations than the deliberative, effortful, 
reasoning typically associated with rationality (Gigrenzer and Todd, 1999; Dijksterhuis 2004), 
in Butler, Guiso and Jappelli (2012) we document a robust relationship between reliance on 
intuition and tolerance for risk and ambiguity in both experimental and large-scale 
representative survey data: those who more readily rely on their intuition when making 
decisions are also significantly more tolerant of risk and ambiguity.  
Still, the direction of causation in these findings can be debated: are more uncertainty-
tolerant individuals more likely to rely on their intuition, or does reliance on intuition reduce 
aversion to risk and ambiguity? In this paper we provide the first experimental evidence 
directly addressing the question of whether variation in reliance on intuition causes shifts in 
such economically fundamental preferences as aversion to risk and ambiguity.  To this end we 
adapt the design of Pham, Lee and Stephen (2012)  to our specific question and directly 
manipulate experimental participants’ willingness to rely on intuition—either reinforcing 
participants’ pre-existing predilections (High Intuition Treatment) or undermining them (Low 
Intuition Treatment)—before collecting incentive-compatible measures of their risk and 
ambiguity preferences.  
We find that male participants randomly assigned to the High Intuition Treatment are 30 
percentage points less likely to be ambiguity averse, and 30 percent more risk tolerant 
according to a standard measure, than male participants randomly assigned to the Low 
Intuition Treatment. We find no effect for female participants, a non-result which could be 
anticipated if females already exhibit a high propensity to rely on intuition which weakens the 
effect of our manipulation.  We provide evidence in support of this interpretation of the gender 
patterns we find. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the following section we outline 
closely related literature.  In Section 3, we present the experimental design followed by results 
in Section 4.  Section 5 concludes.    
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2. Related Research 
 
Research in psychology suggests that people rely on two modes of thinking when making 
decisions.
1  In the terminology of Stanovich and West (2000), the first mode of decision 
making (System 1) is intuitive thinking, while the second mode (System 2) is based on 
effortful reasoning and systematic processing of information. System 2 is calculative, 
analytical and controlled and involves systematic conscious comparisons of different 
alternatives. While such deliberative reasoning is slow, System 1 is quick, automatic and can 
even be unconscious.
2 Although the prevailing view in economics is that reliance on System 
1—e.g., heuristic decision making—leads to worse decision-making (see, e.g., Kahneman 
2011), a handful of papers in the psychological dual-systems vein provide evidence of the 
superior quality of decisions associated with System 1 across various contexts (inter alia, 
Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Dijksterhuis, 2004), particularly when decisions are complex. 
Moreover,  Klein (1998; 2003) conjectures a direct link between decision mode and 
attitudes towards uncertainty by observing that intuitive thinking is uniquely suited to 
adventurous behavior and risk taking. The key point  is that intuition can handle severe 
uncertainty so that individuals who are better at using System 1 may also feel more 
comfortable dealing with uncertainty and risk (though no distinction is made between the two) 
and thus develop higher tolerance for both. It is this feeling of comfort with detection and 
learning about risks that could make intuitive thinkers more tolerant to risk and uncertainty.  
Also related are studies investigating the effect on decision quality of relying on emotion 
versus more deliberative processes. Pham, Lee and Stephen (2012) implement experimental 
1 See Sloman (1996), Evans and Over (1996), Hammond (1996), Stanovich and West (2000), Gilovich et al. (2002), 
Kahneman (2003) and Slovic (2003). 
2  Recent research comparing how fraternal and paternal twins make decisions suggests that reliance  on these 
decision modes has a genetic component and is a stable, individual, trait, see Bouchard and Hur (1998). Our 
experiment shows that decision mode is stable across contexts, and that participants who take longer to reach 
decisions involving uncertain monetary outcomes also took longer to make choices in decisions free of monetary 
consequences (see Table A2 in the Appendix). 
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                                                 treatments which either reinforce or undermine participant’s reliance on emotion in decision-
making and then have participants predict various outcomes, finding enhanced reliance on 
emotion when forecasting outcomes significantly increases predictive accuracy across a wide 
array of situations and time horizons. Interpreting emotion as the opposite of deliberation, Lee, 
Amir and Ariely (2009) manipulate experimental participants’ reliance on emotion by, in one 
treatment, placing some subjects under cognitive load and some not, finding reliance on 
emotion enhances transitivity—a precursor to rationality. More tangentially related  to the 
current inquiry is Inbar, Cone and Gilovich (2010), where the authors investigate what features 
of a decision problem cue deliberative processes versus intuitive processes.  They  find 
evidence that more precisely-stated questions tend to cue rationality.
3  
 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
 
The experiment  was conducted using the on-line labor market Mechanical Turk. 
Participation was restricted to Mechanical Turk workers residing in the United States.  In total 
about 300 individuals participated in the experiment. The experimental design involves two 
phases and two treatments.  Only the first phase—the reliance on intuition manipulation 
phase—varies across treatments. The second phase, in which we elicit ambiguity and risk 
preferences, is identical across treatments.  
Our two treatments are referred to as “High Intuition” and “Low Intuition.” In the first 
phase of the High Intuition (Low Intuition) treatment, participants are asked to briefly describe 
two (ten) situations in which they relied on their intuition to make a decision and it turned out 
to be the correct thing to do.
4  The reasoning behind these treatments is that listing two 
3 It is worth noting that, while the authors of this last study claim to find evidence that more rationality is associated 
with less ambiguity aversion, and more intuitive processes with more ambiguity aversion—i.e., the opposite of 
what we find—their results are actually not clear on this point. This is primarily because what they describe as an 
ambiguous urn in one of their treatments is actually non-ambiguous. The urn in question contained “`…at least two 
red marbles out of the 100, adding that `any number of red marbles from exactly two all the way up to 100 is 
equally likely.’” This urn, while  certainly relatively complex and representing a two-stage lottery, is non-
ambiguous because the number of red marbles in it is known to participants to be uniformly distributed from 2 to 
100.  
4 The situations participants listed varied widely.  Some examples of actual responses: “I made the right decision 
not to buy a particular car, the guy selling it was a con artist;” “Asking a girl out I saw on the street that I dated 
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                                                 situations where intuition provided correct advice should be relatively easy for most people, so 
that the High Intuition treatment should enhance participants’ willingness to rely on their 
intuition in subsequent decisions. On the other hand, coming up with ten such situations will be 
difficult for many people, bringing to mind some cases where intuition failed, so that this 
treatment should not enhance, or may even undermine, our participants’ willingness to rely on 
their intuition. 
The second (common across treatments) phase involves three questions. Participants 
know that only one of these three questions will be chosen to determine their experimental 
earnings and that ten percent of participants will be randomly chosen to be paid their 
experimental earnings. With the first two questions we construct a three-category ambiguity 
preference measure—ambiguity averse, ambiguity neutral or ambiguity seeking—and with the 
third question we elicit a continuous risk preference measure. All three questions as well as our 
method for selecting which participants get paid involve publicly verifiable sources of risk and 
ambiguity to allay concerns about trusting the experimenter (see, e.g., Schneeweiss, 1973; 
Kadane 1992). 
We elicit ambiguity preferences in a way analogous to the standard two-urn, two-choice 
Ellsberg question. In the first question, participants are endowed with an asset that pays $10 if 
a number in the set {0,2,4,5,8} is drawn, and $0 otherwise. Participants must choose between 
one of two sources from which to draw a number between 0 and 9: (i) the third number drawn 
in the next California Mid-Day Daily-3 lottery, which is guaranteed by the State to be 
uniformly distributed over {0,1,…,9}; or (ii) the tenth’s digit of the temperature in Sacramento, 
California just after the next California Mid-Day Daily-3 lottery is conducted.
5  Temperature is 
considered by many a quintessentially ambiguous object.  The second question participants 
face is identical except the asset now pays off if the experimenters draw a number in the set 
{1,3,6,7,9}.
6 We classify individuals who choose the non-ambiguous source (state lottery) in 
for 6 months after;” “Getting the $1 insurance plan on head phones and then they broke in 3 weeks;” “Had only 
glanced in a box lot at a recent auction, but had a feeling that there was something of value in it. Got into a little 
bidding war with another auction attendee and won. I paid immediately so that I could see the contents of my box 
and sure enough, buried at the bottom of the box were three gold coins.” 
5 That is to say, the “x” if the temperature is 72.x.To make this temperature as publicly verifiable as possible, we tell 
participants we will use the publicly available and recorded temperature report on a specific website—
www.weatherforyou.com  —where the temperature is recorded in 5-minute intervals at the tenth’s digit precision. 
6 The sets were chosen to transparently partition the set {0,1,…,9} into two equally likely sets, without using 
such suggestive options as “all odd” or “all even.”  
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                                                                                                                                                         both questions 1 and 2  as ambiguity averse and those who choose the ambiguous source 
(Sacramento temperature) in both of these questions as ambiguity-seeking. 
To obtain a continuous measure of risk preferences, we ask a third, two-stage, question. 
First, we fix the source of chosen numbers to be the (non-ambiguous) state lottery mentioned 
above and allow participants to select, for free, one of the two assets mentioned above.
7 We 
then surprise the participants with a chance to “sell” the asset and elicit their valuation for it 
using a standard BDM mechanism.
8 We use participants’ valuation for the asset elicited in this 
way as a continuous, incentive compatible, measure of risk preferences which is increasing in 
risk tolerance.   
   
4. Results 
   
In Table 1 we report descriptive statistics of our sample.  Our sample is considerably 
older and less educated than a standard student sample.  Also, with the lone exception of 
gender, there are no significant differences in demographics across treatments.  On average, 
our participants are slightly risk averse—valuing a bet with an expected value of $5 at a bit less 
than $5.  Our participants are also roughly equally divided among being ambiguity averse, 
neutral or seeking. Finally, notice that in the raw unconditional data, there is little evidence for 
variation in risk and ambiguity preferences across treatments, prompting us to investigate a bit 
deeper into the data. 
  Toward this end, before turning to this deeper analysis it should be noted that our 
intuition manipulation has the drawback of being relatively one-sided: it is mainly meant to 
enhance reliance on intuition. Consequently, a priori we expect it to have a weak effect on 
participants who already rely on their intuition. For these individuals it may well be as easy to 
come up with ten examples as two examples of intuition being a reliable guide. Data collected 
7 That is to say, participants choose between an asset that pays $10 if the number drawn is in the set {0,2,4,5,8}, 
and another asset that pays $10 if this number is in the set {1,3,6,7,9}.  
8 Only after they have chosen an asset do they learn of their chance to sell their asset. In the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (1964) mechanism we use, revealing one’s true value for an object is a dominant strategy.  To address 
some of the criticisms raised about the use of this device (e.g., Plott and Zeiler, 2005 or Harrison and 
R\:{u}tstrom, 2008), we provide an explanation and description of the incentives in mechanism to the 
participants in layman’s terms and draw a “buying price” from a large interval ($0.00 t0 $10.00) using an 
impartial third-party website (random.org).  
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                                                 for a separate paper (Butler, Guiso and Jappelli, 2012) suggest that women are one such group: 
responses to a standard psychological battery measuring reliance on intuition—the REI, due to 
Pacini and Epstein (1999)—reveal that women are ex-ante much more comfortable relying on 
intuition than men.
9  We document this in Table 2 by regressing the answers to several 
components of the REI on a gender dummy. Most questions listed are negatively related to 
reliance on intuition, so that a positive coefficient indicates less reliance on intuition; the 
exceptions are Q21, Q23 and Q39, where a negative coefficient indicates less reliance on 
intuition. Depending on the question, the intuition indicator is between 4% and 11% larger for 
women than for men—a substantial difference as reflected in the significance patterns given 
the tight distributions typically associated with such scales.
10 Because we expect the effect of 
our treatments to be much weaker for females, in our main analysis we analyze the results for 
males and females separately.  
In Table 3 we present our main results, splitting the sample by gender. Considering 
male participants first (top panel), we find a statistically significant difference in both risk and 
ambiguity preferences across treatments. Columns 1 and 2 report ordered probit estimates 
using as the dependent variable the three-category measure of ambiguity preferences 
mentioned above, ordered so as to be increasing in ambiguity tolerance.  The positive and 
significant coefficients on the High Intuition Treatment dummy indicate that this treatment 
significantly increased male participant’s ambiguity tolerance.  To get a sense of the magnitude 
and distribution of this increase, columns 3-6 report marginal effects from a probit model using 
only a dummy for ambiguity aversion (columns 3-4) or a dummy for being ambiguity seeking 
(columns 5-6) as the dependent variable.  The estimates suggest that the marginal effect of 
being in the High Intuition Treatment is to decrease the probability of being ambiguity averse 
and to increase the probability of being ambiguity seeking by around 30 percentage points, 
suggesting quite a substantial impact of decision mode on preferences for ambiguity. 
9 It only matters that people think they can rely on their intuition—not that they actually do—in order to weaken 
the power of our treatment here.  Therefore, use of the REI is appropriate here even though we do not investigate 
these responses in the paper mentioned. 
10 Table 1 pools all participants from both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 in Butler, Guiso and Jappelli (2012), 
where details are given on the subject pools for these two experiments. We use simple OLS for ease of 
interpretation.  Signs and significance levels are similar if, as is more correct given the categorical nature of the 
dependent variable, ordered probit is used instead. 
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                                                 Next, consider risk preferences. Restricting attention again to male participants 
(columns 7-8), on average being randomly assigned to the High Intuition treatment increased  
reported certainty equivalents for a 50/50 win $10, lose $0 bet—our measure of risk 
tolerance—by about $2 irrespective of demographic controls. In percentage terms, this 
represents an approximately 30 percent increase in our measure of risk tolerance, controlling 
for available demographics (column 8).  
By way of contrast, among female participants (Table 3, bottom panel), we find no 
discernible difference in preferences for either risk or ambiguity between our two treatments. 
Estimated coefficients are all small in magnitude compared to our male participants and 
consistently non-significant. This is true  whether or not one controls for available 
demographics.  
Summing up, among the subset of experimental participants where one would a priori 
expect our manipulation to have an effect (males), we find evidence that directly enhancing 
reliance on intuition moves risk and ambiguity preferences substantially, increasing tolerance 
for both risk and ambiguity. Among the subset of participant where we were a priori less 
confident in the strength of our treatments (females), we find little effect. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Preferences over risk and uncertainty are fundamental to much of economics.   
Understanding what shapes and moves these attitudes or preferences can help inform our 
models and analyses.  In this paper we provide a link between decision theory and 
psychological research on decision processes in showing that variation in decision mode—how 
much one relies on intuition when making choices—can result in substantial variation in 
preferences for risk and ambiguity. 
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  10 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
The table presents descriptive statistics of experiment participants overall and by treatment.  Demographics are 
self-reported.  “Male” is a dummy indicating the participant reported being male indicator variable for male. 
“Age” is 2012 minus self-reported year born. “Has college degree” is a dummy indicating that the participant 
ticked “Bachelor's degree” on a list of possible levels of education on which as many as applied could be ticked. 
“Risk tolerance measure” is the participant’s certainty equivalent for a 50/50 win $10/lose $0 lottery as described 
in the text.  There is little difference in demographics across treatments, indicating that randomization into 
treatments was generally successful, the major exception being gender.   
 
Descriptive Statistics 
    Treatment    t-test 
  Overall 
Low 
Intuition 
High 
Intuition 
Obs not 
missing 
High Intuition = 
Low Intuition 
Male  0.36  0.31  0.43  298  p = 0.04 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)     
Age  36.16  37.06  35.43  296  p = 0.25 
  (0.71)  (1.09)  (0.93)     
College degree  0.39  0.36  0.41  298  p = 0.32 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)     
Income ≤ $30K  0.46  0.43  0.49  293  p = 0.32 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)     
$30K < Inc ≤ $70K  0.39  0.39  0.38  293  p = 0.79 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)     
Income > $70K  0.15  0.17  0.13  293  p = 0.30 
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)     
Ambiguity averse  0.35  0.29  0.39  298  p = 0.06 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)     
Ambiguity seeking  0.33  0.37  0.29  298  p = 0.14 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)     
Risk tolerance measure  4.69  4.48  4.87  298  p = 0.18 
  (0.14)  (0.21)  (0.19)     
Obs  298  134  164     
 
 
 
 
 
  11 Table 2. Impact of Gender on Responses to the Rational Experiential Inventory 
 
Each row of the table reports the coefficient from a separate OLS model using as the dependent variable responses 
to selected Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) questions and as the sole explanatory variable an indicator for 
being male. For each REI question, participants are asked: “Please indicate using a scale from 1 to 5 how true 
each of the following statements is as it pertains to you, where 1 = `the statement is completely false’ and 5 = `the 
statement is completely true.’”. Both signs and significance levels are robust to controlling for our standard set of 
demographic controls, including age, math score—a measure of cognitive ability—and total family income for all 
questions and to estimating ordered probit models instead of OLS. Most questions listed are negatively related to 
reliance on intuition, so that a positive coefficient indicates less reliance on intuition; the exceptions are Q21, Q23 
and Q39, where a negative coefficient indicates less reliance on intuition.  Standard errors in parentheses,  *** = 
significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level.   
 
   Coefficient (Std Error) 
REI Question Number  Male Dummy  Constant 
Q1   =  “I have a logical mind”  0.25
***   (0.05)  3.69***  (0.04) 
Q14 = "I am much better at figuring things out 
logically than most people" 
0.17
***     (0.05)  3.82***  (0.04) 
Q21 = "I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my 
deepest gut feelings to find an answer" 
-0.15
***  (0.05)  3.05***  (0.04) 
Q22 = "I think it is foolish to make important 
decisions based on feelings" 
0.14
**   (0.05)  3.20***  (0.04) 
Q23 = "I tend to use my heart as a guide for my 
actions." 
-0.33
***  (0.05)  2.93***  (0.04) 
Q26 = "I enjoy intellectual challenges."  0.15
**  (0.05)  3.95***  (0.04) 
Q30 = "Using logic usually works well for me in 
figuring out problems in my life." 
0.22
***  (0.05)  3.58***  (0.04) 
Q39 = "I am not very good at solving problems that 
require careful logical analysis." 
-0.15
***  (0.05)  2.11***  (0.04) 
Q40 = "I enjoy solving problems that require hard 
thinking." 
0.28
***  (0.05)  3.51***  (0.04) 
Observations  1304          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  12 Table 3. Risk and Ambiguity Tolerance, by Gender 
 
The table shows the effect of High intuition treatment on preferences for risk and ambiguity. Columns 1 and 2 
present ordered probit estimates. Columns 3-6 report marginal effects estimated from a probit model.  Columns 7 
and 8 report OLS estimates. “High intuition treatment” is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 
manipulation was designed to enhance confidence in intuition. “Ambiguity tolerance” is a 3-category variable 
increasing in ambiguity tolerance: it takes the value 0 if the participant is ambiguity averse, 1 if neither ambiguity 
averse nor ambiguity seeking and 2 if ambiguity seeking. Ambiguity averse (seeking) are indicator variables 
taking the value of 1 if the participant was classified as ambiguity averse (seeking) and 0 otherwise. “Risk 
tolerance” is a continuous variable increasing in risk tolerance. Demographic controls are: age, age squared, 
college degree (binary) and dummies for low and medium income. All estimates include controls for: i) (local) 
time of day, which has been shown to attitudes toward uncertainty toward; ii) time zone as a proxy for regional 
differences in attitudes; iii) time spent on phase 1 of the experiment, to control for unequal earnings expectations 
due to the difference in time required to list two versus ten relevant situations; and iv) the source (lottery or 
temperature) determining the 10% of participants chosen to be paid; and v) session fixed effects.  Standard errors 
in parentheses,  *** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level.   
 
   Ambiguity tolerance 
(3-cat)  Ambiguity averse  Ambiguity seeking  Risk tolerance 
(continuous) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Male participants only 
High Intuition 
treatment  0.76**  0.85**  -0.32**  -0.34*  0.26*  0.29**  2.12***  1.96** 
  (0.32)  (0.39)  (0.15)  (0.18)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.74)  (0.78) 
Constant              3.68**  7.12** 
              (1.58)  (2.96) 
Demographic 
controls?  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Obs  106  105  106  105  106  105  106  105 
R-squared   0.09  0.11  0.19   0.25   0.13   0.15   0.23  0.30 
                 
  Female participants only 
High Intuition 
treatment  -0.05  -0.03  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.02  -0.25  -0.36 
  (0.29)  (0.30)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.61)  (0.63) 
Constant              6.08***  8.45*** 
              (0.95)  (2.46) 
Demographic 
controls?  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Obs  187  181  187  181  187  181  187  181 
R-squared  0.08   0.08   0.13   0.14   0.11   0.11   0.11  0.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  13 Instructions Appendix 
 [Screen 1] 
Welcome to Experiment 132 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in our experiment. This is a study in decision making. 
Throughout the course of the study, which should take no more than a handful of minutes, we 
will ask you to make various decisions and answer a few questions. When responding, please 
keep in mind that this is not a test -- i.e., there are no correct or incorrect answers. We are only 
interested in your actual decisions, preferences and thoughts. 
To proceed, please enter your Mechanical Turk worker id. This allows us to know whom to 
pay. It has the further benefit of allowing us, to some extent, to screen out robots. 
 
[Screen 2] 
Instructions, page 1 
This experiment involves two parts: 
1.  In the first part, we ask you to respond to a simple question.  Your response in first part 
will not affect your earnings from this experiment at all. 
2.  In the second part, you will be asked to make a few decisions involving monetary 
consequences.  Your decisions in this second part will determine your potential 
earnings from this experiment.  
3.  In particular, one of the decision scenarios in the second part will be chosen, at 
random, to determine your potential earnings from the experiment. Since each of the 
decision scenarios may therefore completely determine your potential earnings from 
this experiment, it is in your best interest to choose according to your true preferences. 
Approximately ten percent (10%) of participants will actually be paid their potential 
earnings from this experiment.  The remaining participants will be paid only the fixed fee 
listed on the HIT.   
How we choose the ten percent of participants to pay is detailed on the next page. 
 
[Screen 3A.  Please note that only one of screens 3A or 3B is shown; which one shown is 
randomly determined] 
Instructions, page 2 
To be as fair and transparent as possible, the ten percent (10%) of participants who will 
actually be paid their potential earnings are determined as follows: 
  14 •  On the next page, you will choose a number from 0 to 9. 
•  We will compare your chosen number to the first number to the right of the decimal 
point of the temperature in Sacramento, California just before 1 pm (California time) 
the next time this occurs after you complete this experiment. 
•  If these two numbers match, you will actually be paid your potential earnings from this 
experiment; otherwise, you will earn only the fixed participation fee listed on the HIT. 
•  These earnings will be paid as a bonus to your mechanical turk worker account. 
•  To be clear, if the temperature is 72.5, the relevant number is "5."  
•  To avoid misunderstandings, we will use the temperature as publicly reported 
here: http://www.pwsweather.com/obs/GREENHAVEN.html, where it is recorded 
every 5 minutes.  We will use the report closest to, but still before, before 1pm. 
When you have read and understood these terms, continue to the next page to select a number. 
 
 
[Screen 3B:  note, only one of screens 3A or 3B is shown; which one shown is 
randomly determined] 
To be as fair and transparent as possible, the ten percent (10%) of participants who will 
actually be paid their potential earnings are determined as follows: 
•  On the next page, you will choose a number from 0 to 9. 
•  We will compare your chosen number to the first number drawn in the next California 
mid-day Daily 3 (around 1 pm, California time) the next time this occurs after you 
complete this experiment. 
•  If these two numbers match, you will actually be paid your potential earnings from this 
experiment; otherwise, you will earn only the fixed participation fee listed on the HIT. 
•  These earnings will be paid as a bonus to your mechanical turk worker account. 
•  To be clear, if the numbers drawn are 5 4 3, the relevant number is "5."  
•  To avoid misunderstandings, we will use the numbers drawn as publicly reported 
here: http://www.calottery.com/play/draw-games/daily-3 
When you have read and understood these terms, continue to the next page to select a number. 
 
 
[Screen 4] 
Select a number: 
  15 ( ) 0  ( ) 1  ( ) 2  ( ) 3  ( ) 4  ( ) 5  ( ) 6  ( ) 7  ( ) 8  ( ) 9 
 
[Screen 5] 
Instructions, page 3 
Please note: 
The decision scenarios in the second part of the experiment will depend on two ways of 
randomly determining whole numbers from 0 to 9. 
The first way is to use the results from "California (mid-day) Daily 3," an official 
California state lottery, the next time this lottery is conducted after you submit your 
experiment.  This lottery is conducted every day around 1pm (California time) and the results 
are always posted on the official website a few minutes after 1pm.  We will use either the first, 
second, or third number drawn, specifying each time which draw is relevant. 
The second way is to rely on the digit just to the right of the decimal point of the 
temperature in Sacramento, California just after 1 pm (California time).  At the weather site 
listed below, this temperature is publicly reported and recorded every five minutes.  The 
relevant temperature will be the closest temperature report to, but still after 1 pm.   To be 
clear, if the temperature in Sacramento is 72.5 degrees fahrenheit in this report, the relevant 
number would be "5." 
To be as transparent as possible, we will use the following publicly reported sources: 
•  Sacramento temperature: http://www.pwsweather.com/obs/GREENHAVEN.html 
•  California (mid-day) Daily 3:  http://www.calottery.com/play/draw-games/daily-3 
 
[Screen 6A: Low Intuition treatment.  Please note that only one of screens 6A or 6B is 
shown; which one shown is randomly determined] 
Part 1 
Many scientists and researchers across various academic disciplines believe that people rely 
on two modes of thinking when making decisions. The first mode of decision making can be 
thought of as "intuitive thinking," while the second mode of thought is based on effortful 
reasoning and systematic processing of information. This second mode of thought - 
"deliberative reasoning" - is calculative, analytical and controlled and involves systematic 
conscious comparisons of different alternatives. "Intuitive thinking," on the other hand, is 
quick, automatic and can even be unconscious 
  16 Please briefly describe 10 situations in which you trusted your intuition to make a judgment or 
a decision and it was the right thing to do. 
Situation 1: _________________________ 
Situation 2: _________________________ 
Situation 3: _________________________ 
Situation 4: _________________________ 
Situation 5: _________________________ 
Situation 6: _________________________ 
Situation 7: _________________________ 
Situation 8: _________________________ 
Situation 9: _________________________ 
Situation 10: _________________________ 
 
[Screen 6B: High Intuition treatment] 
Part 1 
Many scientists and researchers across various academic disciplines believe that people rely 
on two modes of thinking when making decisions. The first mode of decision making can be 
thought of as "intuitive thinking," while the second mode of thought is based on effortful 
reasoning and systematic processing of information. This second mode of thought - 
"deliberative reasoning" - is calculative, analytical and controlled and involves systematic 
conscious comparisons of different alternatives. "Intuitive thinking," on the other hand, is 
quick, automatic and can even be unconscious 
Please briefly describe 2 situations in which you trusted your intuition to make a judgment or a 
decision and it was the right thing to do. 
Situation 1: _________________________ 
Situation 2: _________________________ 
 
 
 
[Screen 7] 
  17 You will now begin the second part of the experiment. This section consists of three 
separate decision-making scenarios, each of which involves an opportunity to make money. 
 Each new decision-making scenario will be clearly labeled as it arises. 
Please note  that  only one  of the three decision-making scenarios will be chosen, at 
random, to determine your earnings.  Since each of the three scenarios may determine your 
earnings from this experiment, it is in your best interest to choose according to your true 
preferences in each scenario.  
Click "Next" to proceed to the first decision-making scenario 
 
 
[Screen 8] 
Decision-making Scenario 1 
You are given one lottery ticket for free. This ticket pays you $10 if a randomly selected 
number is one of the following: 0, 2, 5, 6, or 8. You get to choose from where to draw the 
number. You can choose between one of two sources: 
 
•   the third number drawn in the next "California Mid-Day Daily 3"  
•  the temperature in Sacramento, California 
 
Choose the source from which to draw a number: [order in which options appear is 
randomized] 
( ) California Mid-Day Daily 3 
( ) Temperature in Sacramento, California 
 
 
[Screen 9] 
Decision-making Scenario 2 
You are given one lottery ticket for free. This ticket pays you $10 if a randomly selected 
number is one of the following: 1, 3, 6, 7, or 9. You get to choose from where to draw the 
number. You can choose between one of two sources: 
  18  
•   the third number drawn in the next "California Mid-Day Daily 3"  
•  the temperature in Sacramento, California 
 
Choose the source from which to draw a number: [order in which options appear is 
randomized] 
( ) California Mid-Day Daily 3 
( ) Temperature in Sacramento, California 
 
 
[Screen 10] 
Decision-making Scenario 3: 
You are offered the choice between two lottery tickets.  Earnings from the two lottery 
tickets are determined by the third number drawn in the next "California Mid-Day Daily 3" as 
follows:   
•  Ticket L pays $10 if this number is 0, 2, 5, 6, or 8 
•  Ticket R pays $10 if this number is 1, 3, 4, 7, or 9 
 
Choose a ticket: [order in which options appear is randomized] 
( ) Ticket L 
( ) Ticket R 
 
[Screen 11] 
Decision-making Scenario 3, continued 
You now have the opportunity to sell the ticket you just chose, for a price.   
•  You will report the lowest price you would accept in order to sell your ticket.   
•  At the same time, we will randomly choose a price to offer you for the ticket, from 
$0.00 to $10.00. 
  19 •  If our "offer price" is larger than the number you report, we will pay you the offer price 
in exchange for your ticket. 
•  If our "offer price" is less than or equal to the number you report, you keep your ticket. 
More details are provided below. 
 
What is the lowest price you would accept to give up your lottery ticket? _______  
 
More details 
In order to give you incentives to truthfully report your lowest acceptable price as 
accurately as possible:  
•  We will randomly choose a number from 0.00 to 10.00 using the website random.org.  
•  Call this number "z."  
•  If z is higher than the "lowest acceptable price" you report, we will pay you $z, but 
take away your lottery ticket.  
•  If z is less than or equal to your reported "lowest acceptable price," you keep your 
lottery ticket but we do not pay you z.  
You can think of the number we randomly draw as an amount of money you are offered 
for your ticket. If the amount of money you are offered is high enough, you sell your ticket. If 
the amount of money offered is too low, you keep your ticket. What is "high enough" or "too 
low" is up to you to decide. 
 
 
[Screen 12] 
Tell us about yourself 
You are now finished with the experiment. Thanks for your time and effort - we really 
appreciate it. 
On the next page you will be provided with a unique end-of-experiment code that you 
will use to complete your HIT. 
Before you go, however, please take a moment to tell us a few things about yourself. 
Every question on this page is voluntary and will not affect your earnings from this 
experiment in any way. 
  20  
Gender? 
In what year were you born? 
In what month were you born? 
In what country were you born? 
[If born in the US:] In what US state were you born? 
Approximately what was your total income last fiscal year? 
( ) $10,000 or less 
( ) $10,001 - $30,000 
( ) $30,001 - $50,000 
( ) $50,001 - $70,000 
( ) $70,001 - $90,000 
( ) $90,001 - $110,000 
( ) $110,001 - $130,000 
( ) $130,001 - $150,000 
( ) $150,001 - $170,000 
( ) $170,001 - $190,000 
( ) $190,001 or more 
 
Which of the following academic degrees have you obtained (check all that apply) 
( ) High school diploma 
( ) Some college, but no degree 
( ) Associate degree 
( ) Bachelor's degree 
( ) Master's degree 
( ) Technical certificate 
( ) Professional degree 
( ) PhD 
  21  
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